| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16627 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16627 |
| Green Clubs | |
| Klaas van '; t Veld; Matthew J. Kotchen | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-12-16 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper treats programs in which firms voluntarily agree to meet environmental standards as "green clubs": clubs, because they provide non-rival but excludable reputation benefits to participating firms; green, because they also generate environmental public goods. The model illuminates a central tension between the congestion externality familiar from conventional club theory and the free-riding externality familiar from the theory on private provision of public goods. We compare three common program sponsors--governments, industry, and environmental groups. We find that if monitoring of the club standard is perfect, a government constrained from regulating club size may prefer to leave sponsorship to industry if public-good benefits are sufficiently low, or to environmentalists if public-good benefits are sufficiently high. If monitoring is imperfect, an important question is whether consumers can infer that a club is too large for its standard to be credible. If they can, then the government may deliberately choose an imperfect monitoring mechanism as a way of regulating club size indirectly. If they cannot, then this reinforces the government's preference for delegating sponsorship. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16627 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574301 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Klaas van ',t Veld,Matthew J. Kotchen. Green Clubs. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16627.pdf（427KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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