G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w16627
来源IDWorking Paper 16627
Green Clubs
Klaas van '; t Veld; Matthew J. Kotchen
发表日期2010-12-16
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要This paper treats programs in which firms voluntarily agree to meet environmental standards as "green clubs": clubs, because they provide non-rival but excludable reputation benefits to participating firms; green, because they also generate environmental public goods. The model illuminates a central tension between the congestion externality familiar from conventional club theory and the free-riding externality familiar from the theory on private provision of public goods. We compare three common program sponsors--governments, industry, and environmental groups. We find that if monitoring of the club standard is perfect, a government constrained from regulating club size may prefer to leave sponsorship to industry if public-good benefits are sufficiently low, or to environmentalists if public-good benefits are sufficiently high. If monitoring is imperfect, an important question is whether consumers can infer that a club is too large for its standard to be credible. If they can, then the government may deliberately choose an imperfect monitoring mechanism as a way of regulating club size indirectly. If they cannot, then this reinforces the government's preference for delegating sponsorship.
主题Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w16627
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574301
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Klaas van ',t Veld,Matthew J. Kotchen. Green Clubs. 2010.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
w16627.pdf(427KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Klaas van ']的文章
[t Veld]的文章
[Matthew J. Kotchen]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Klaas van ']的文章
[t Veld]的文章
[Matthew J. Kotchen]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Klaas van ']的文章
[t Veld]的文章
[Matthew J. Kotchen]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: w16627.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。