| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16632 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16632 |
| Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment | |
| Rohan Pitchford; Mark L. J. Wright | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Why is it difficult to restructure sovereign debt in a timely manner? In this paper we present a theory of the sovereign debt restructuring process in which delay arises as individual creditors hold-up a set- tlement in order to extract greater payments from the sovereign. We then use the theory to analyze recent policy proposals aimed at ensuring equal repayment of creditor claims. Strikingly, we show that such collective action policies may increase delay by encouraging free-riding on negotiation costs, even while preventing hold-up and reducing total negotiation costs. A calibrated version of the model can account for observed delays, and finds that free riding is quantitatively relevant: whereas in sim- ple low-cost debt restructuring operations collective mechanisms will reduce delay by more than 60%, in high-cost complicated restructurings the adoption of such mechanisms results in a doubling of delay. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; International Economics ; International Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16632 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574306 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rohan Pitchford,Mark L. J. Wright. Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16632.pdf（290KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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