| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16635 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16635 |
| Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance | |
| Alain de Janvry; Frederico Finan; Elisabeth Sadoulet | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates among children of poor households in Brazil. We show that while this federal program successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program's impact was 36 percent larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities compared to those with lame-duck mayors. First term mayors with good program performance were much more likely to get re-elected. These mayors adopted program implementation practices that were not only more transparent but also associated with better program outcomes. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16635 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574309 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alain de Janvry,Frederico Finan,Elisabeth Sadoulet. Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program Performance. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16635.pdf（189KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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