全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Dynamic Incentive Contracts Under Parameter Uncertainty

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w16649
来源ID	Working Paper 16649
	Dynamic Incentive Contracts Under Parameter Uncertainty
	Julien Prat; Boyan Jovanovic
发表日期	2010-12-31
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed and when the effort and noise affect output additively. We then analytically solve for the optimal contract when the agent has exponential utility. We find that the Pareto frontier shifts out as information about the agent's quality improves. In the standard spot-market setup, by contrast, when the parameter measures the agent's 'quality', the Pareto frontier shifts inwards with better information. Commitment is therefore more valuable when quality is known more precisely. Incentives then are easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the beliefs of the principal. Moreover, in contrast to results under one-period commitment, wage volatility declines as experience accumulates.
主题	Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w16649
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574325
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Julien Prat,Boyan Jovanovic. Dynamic Incentive Contracts Under Parameter Uncertainty. 2010.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w16649.pdf（599KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览