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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w16650
来源IDWorking Paper 16650
Bailouts and the Preservation of Competition
James W. Roberts; Andrew Sweeting
发表日期2010-12-31
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要Governments rescue private companies partly to prevent other firms from gaining excessive market power. However, if failing firms exit, new entry may limit remaining firms' market power if there are potential entrants who can be as effective competitors as the firms leaving the market. We quantify these effects in the case of the 1984 bailout of timber companies that faced substantial losses on existing federal timber contracts. We predict that the bailout substantially increased sale prices in subsequent auctions because firms that might have might have been induced to enter without the bailout tended to have relatively low values.
主题Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Antitrust ; Industry Studies
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w16650
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574326
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James W. Roberts,Andrew Sweeting. Bailouts and the Preservation of Competition. 2010.
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