| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16650 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16650 |
| Bailouts and the Preservation of Competition | |
| James W. Roberts; Andrew Sweeting | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-12-31 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Governments rescue private companies partly to prevent other firms from gaining excessive market power. However, if failing firms exit, new entry may limit remaining firms' market power if there are potential entrants who can be as effective competitors as the firms leaving the market. We quantify these effects in the case of the 1984 bailout of timber companies that faced substantial losses on existing federal timber contracts. We predict that the bailout substantially increased sale prices in subsequent auctions because firms that might have might have been induced to enter without the bailout tended to have relatively low values. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Antitrust ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16650 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574326 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James W. Roberts,Andrew Sweeting. Bailouts and the Preservation of Competition. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16650.pdf（446KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
