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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w16687
来源IDWorking Paper 16687
Letting Down the Team? Evidence of Social Effects of Team Incentives
Philip Babcock; Kelly Bedard; Gary Charness; John Hartman; Heather Royer
发表日期2011-01-13
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要This paper estimates social effects of incentivizing people in teams. In two field experiments featuring exogenous team formation and opportunities for repeated social interactions, we find large team effects that operate through social channels. The team compensation system induced agents to choose effort as if they valued a marginal dollar of compensation for their teammate from two-thirds as much (in one study) to twice as much as they valued a dollar of their own compensation (in the other study). We conclude that social effects of monetary team incentives exist and can induce effort at lower cost than through direct individual payment.
主题Other ; History of Economic Thought ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w16687
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574362
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GB/T 7714
Philip Babcock,Kelly Bedard,Gary Charness,et al. Letting Down the Team? Evidence of Social Effects of Team Incentives. 2011.
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