全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Provincial and Local Governments in China: Fiscal Institutions and Government Behavior

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w16694
来源ID	Working Paper 16694
	Provincial and Local Governments in China: Fiscal Institutions and Government Behavior
	Roger H. Gordon; Wei Li
发表日期	2011-01-13
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	What are the incentives faced by local officials in China? Without democratic institutions, there is no mechanism for local residents to exercise "voice". Given the hukou registration system, local residents have little opportunity to threaten "exit" if they are unhappy with local taxes and spending. This paper explores an alternative source of incentives, starting from the premise that local officials aim to maximize the jurisdiction's fiscal residual (profits), equal to local tax revenue minus expenditures on public services. In a Tiebout setting with mobile households, this objective should lead to efficient provision. What happens, though, if firms and economic activity but not people are mobile? The paper examines the incentives faced by local Chinese officials in this context, and argues that the forecasted behavior helps to explain both the successes and the problems arising from local government activity in China.
主题	Public Economics ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Development and Growth ; Development ; Innovation and R& ; D ; Country Studies ; Other ; Economic Systems
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w16694
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574369
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Roger H. Gordon,Wei Li. Provincial and Local Governments in China: Fiscal Institutions and Government Behavior. 2011.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w16694.pdf（542KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览