| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w16735
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 16735
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| Transaction Cost Regulation |
| Pablo T. Spiller
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| 发表日期 | 2011-01-27
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| 出版年 | 2011
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper discusses the fundamental underpinnings and some implications of transaction cost regulation (TCR), a framework to analyze the interaction between governments and investors fundamentally, but not exclusively, in utility industries. TCR sees regulation as the governance structure of these interactions, and thus, as in standard transaction cost economics, it places emphasis in understanding the nature of the hazards inherent to these interactions. The emphasis on transactional hazards requires a microanalytical perspective, where performance assessment is undertaken within the realm of possible institutional alternative. In that sense, politics becomes fundamental to understanding regulation as the governance of public / private interactions. The paper discusses two fundamental hazards and their organizational implications: governmental and third party opportunism. Both interact to make regulatory processes and outcomes more rigid, formalistic, and prone to conflict than envisioned by relational contracting. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics
; Welfare and Collective Choice
; Industrial Organization
; Market Structure and Firm Performance
; Regulatory Economics
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16735
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574409
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Pablo T. Spiller. Transaction Cost Regulation. 2011.
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文件名：
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w16735.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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