全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Deposit Insurance Without Commitment: Wall St. Versus Main St

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w16752
来源ID	Working Paper 16752
	Deposit Insurance Without Commitment: Wall St. Versus Main St
	Russell Cooper; Hubert Kempf
发表日期	2011-01-27
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	This paper studies the provision of deposit insurance without commitment in an economy with heterogenous households. When households are identical, deposit insurance will be provided ex post to reap insurance gains. But the ex post provision of deposit insurance redistributes consumption when households differ in their claims on the banking system as well as in their tax obligations to finance the deposit insurance. Deposit insurance will not be provided ex post if it requires a (socially) undesirable redistribution of consumption which outweighs insurance gains.
主题	Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w16752
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574426
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Russell Cooper,Hubert Kempf. Deposit Insurance Without Commitment: Wall St. Versus Main St. 2011.