| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16804 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16804 |
| Cream Skimming in Financial Markets | |
| Patrick Bolton; Tano Santos; Jose A. Scheinkman | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-02-18 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose an equilibrium occupational choice model, where agents can choose to work in the real sector (become entrepreneurs) or to become informed dealers in financial markets. Agents incur costs to become informed dealers and develop skills for valuing assets up for trade. The financial sector comprises a transparent competitive exchange, where uninformed agents trade and an opaque over-the-counter (OTC) market, where informed dealers offer attractive terms for the most valuable assets entrepreneurs put up for sale. Thanks to their information advantage and valuation skills, dealers are able to provide incentives to entrepreneurs to originate good assets. However, the opaqueness of the OTC market allows dealers to extract informational rents from entrepreneurs. Trade in the OTC market imposes a negative externality on the organized exchange, where only the less valuable assets end up for trade. We show that in equilibrium the dealers' informational rents in the OTC market are too large and attract too much talent to the financial industry. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16804 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574479 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick Bolton,Tano Santos,Jose A. Scheinkman. Cream Skimming in Financial Markets. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16804.pdf（310KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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