| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16812 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16812 |
| Does Tax Policy Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Postwar Tax Reforms | |
| Carola Frydman; Raven S. Molloy | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-02-18 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The trends in executive pay and labor income tax rates since the 1940s suggest a high elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax policy. By contrast, the level and structure of executive compensation have been largely unresponsive to tax incentives since the 1980s. However, the relative tax advantage of different forms of pay was small during this period. Using a sample of top executives in large firms from 1946 to 2005, we also find a small short run response of salaries, qualified stock options, and bonuses paid after retirement to changes in tax rates on labor income--even though tax rates were significantly higher and more heterogeneous across individuals in the first several decades following WWII. We explore several potential explanations for the conflicting impressions given by the long-run and short-run correlations between taxes and pay, including changes in social norms and concerns about pay equality. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; History ; Labor and Health History |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16812 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574487 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Carola Frydman,Raven S. Molloy. Does Tax Policy Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Postwar Tax Reforms. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16812.pdf（264KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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