| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16851 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16851 |
| Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions | |
| Susan Athey; Dominic Coey; Jonathan Levin | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-03-03 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and natural resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales where we estimate the model, and when we predict (out of sample) bidder entry and prices for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry to small businesses substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it does increase small business participation. An alternative policy of subsidizing small bidders would increase revenue and small bidder profit, while eliminating almost all of the efficiency loss of set-asides, and only slightly decreasing the profit of larger firms. We explain these findings by connecting to the theory of optimal auction design. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16851 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574525 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Susan Athey,Dominic Coey,Jonathan Levin. Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16851.pdf（378KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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