全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Effect of Allowing Pollution Offsets With Imperfect Enforcement

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w16860
来源ID	Working Paper 16860
	The Effect of Allowing Pollution Offsets With Imperfect Enforcement
	Hilary Sigman; Howard F. Chang
发表日期	2011-03-03
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	Public policies for pollution control, including climate change policies, sometimes allow polluters in one sector subject to an emissions cap to offset excessive emissions in that sector with pollution abatement in another sector. The government may often find it more costly to verify offset claims than to verify compliance with emissions caps. Concerns about such difficulties in enforcement may lead regulators to restrict the use of offsets. In this paper, we demonstrate that allowing offsets may increase pollution abatement and reduce illegal pollution, even if the government has a fixed enforcement budget. We explore the circumstances that may make allowing pollution offsets an attractive option when enforcement is costly.
主题	Other ; Law and Economics ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w16860
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574534
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Hilary Sigman,Howard F. Chang. The Effect of Allowing Pollution Offsets With Imperfect Enforcement. 2011.