| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16929 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16929 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points | |
| Oliver D. Hart | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-04-07 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze noncontractible investments in a model with shading. A seller can make an investment that affects a buyer's value. The parties have outside options that depend on asset ownership. When shading is not possible and there is no contract renegotiation, an optimum can be achieved by giving the seller the right to make a take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offer. However, with shading, such a contract creates deadweight losses. We show that an optimal contract will limit the seller's offers, and possibly create ex post inefficiency. Asset ownership can improve matters even if revelation mechanisms are allowed. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16929 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574604 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Oliver D. Hart. Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16929.pdf（222KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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