| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16963 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16963 |
| Contracting for Impure Public Goods: Carbon Offsets and Additionality | |
| Charles Mason; Andrew Plantinga | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-04-21 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Governments contracting with private agents for the provision of an impure public good must contend with agents who would potentially supply the good absent any payments. This additionality problem is centrally important to the use of carbon offsets to mitigate climate change. We analyze optimal contracts for forest carbon, an important offset category. A novel national-scale simulation of the contracts is conducted that uses econometric results derived from micro data. For a 50 million acre increase in forest area, annual government expenditures with optimal contracts are found to be about $4 billion lower compared to costs with a uniform subsidy. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Renewable Resources |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16963 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574638 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles Mason,Andrew Plantinga. Contracting for Impure Public Goods: Carbon Offsets and Additionality. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16963.pdf（275KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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