| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16994 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16994 |
| Illiquid Banks, Financial Stability, and Interest Rate Policy | |
| Douglas W. Diamond; Raghuram Rajan | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-04-28 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Banks finance illiquid assets with demandable deposits, which discipline bankers but expose them to damaging runs. Authorities may not want to stand by and watch banks collapse. However, unconstrained direct bailouts undermine the disciplinary role of deposits. Moreover, competition forces banks to promise depositors more, increasing intervention and making the system worse off. By contrast, constrained central bank intervention to lower rates maintains private discipline, while offsetting contractual rigidity. It may still lead banks to make excessive liquidity promises. Anticipating this, central banks should raise rates in normal times to offset distortions from reducing rates in adverse times. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16994 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574668 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Douglas W. Diamond,Raghuram Rajan. Illiquid Banks, Financial Stability, and Interest Rate Policy. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16994.pdf（497KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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