| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17010 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17010 |
| Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers | |
| Mike Burkart; Denis Gromb; Holger M. Mueller; Fausto Panunzi | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-05-05 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the role of legal investor protection for the efficiency of the market for corporate control. Stronger legal investor protection limits the ease with which an acquirer, once in control, can extract private benefits at the expense of non-controlling investors. This, in turn, increases the acquirer's capacity to raise outside funds to finance the takeover. Absent effective competition for the target, the increased outside funding capacity does not make efficient takeovers more likely, however, because the bid price, and thus the acquirer's need for funds, increase in lockstep with his pledgeable income. In contrast, under effective competition, the increased outside funding capacity makes it less likely that the takeover outcome is determined by the bidders' financing constraints-and thus by their internal funds-and more likely that it is determined by their ability to create value. Accordingly, stronger legal investor protection can improve the efficiency of the takeover outcome. Taking into account the interaction between legal investor protection and financing constraints also provides new insights into the optimal allocation of voting rights, sales of controlling blocks, and the role of legal investor protection in cross-border M&A. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17010 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574684 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mike Burkart,Denis Gromb,Holger M. Mueller,et al. Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17010.pdf（251KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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