| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17031 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17031 |
| Individual Preferences, Organization, and Competition in a Model of R&D Incentive Provision | |
| Nicola Lacetera; Lorenzo Zirulia | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-05-05 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Understanding the organization of R&D activities requires the simultaneous consideration of scientific workers' talent and tastes, companies' organizational choices, and the characteristics of the relevant industry. We develop a model of the provision of incentives to corporate scientists, in an environment where (1) scientists engage in multiple activities when performing research; (2) knowledge is not perfectly appropriable; (3) scientists are responsive to both monetary and non-monetary incentives; and (4) firms compete on the product market. We show that both the degree of knowledge spillovers and of market competition affect the incentives given to scientists, and these effects interact. First, high knowledge spillovers lead firms to soften incentives when product market competition is high, and to strengthen incentives when competition is low. Second, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives is U-shaped, with the exact shape depending on the degree of knowledge spillovers. We also show that the performance-contingent pay for both applied and basic research increases with the non-pecuniary benefits that scientists obtain from research. We relate our findings to the existing empirical research, and also discuss their implications for management and public policy. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Firm Behavior ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17031 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574704 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicola Lacetera,Lorenzo Zirulia. Individual Preferences, Organization, and Competition in a Model of R&D Incentive Provision. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17031.pdf（358KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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