全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Gun For Hire: Does Delegated Enforcement Crowd out Peer Punishment in Giving to Public Goods?

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w17033
来源ID	Working Paper 17033
	Gun For Hire: Does Delegated Enforcement Crowd out Peer Punishment in Giving to Public Goods?
	James Andreoni; Laura K. Gee
发表日期	2011-05-05
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the "hired gun" mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group welfare. The "hired gun" mechanism (Andreoni and Gee, 2011) is an example of a low cost device that promotes complete compliances and minimal enforcement as the unique Nash equilibrium. We find that subjects are willing to pay to hire a delegated policing mechanism over 70% of the time, and that this mechanism increases welfare between 15% to 40%. Moreover, the lion's share of the welfare gain comes because the hired gun crowds out vigilante peer-to-peer punishments.
主题	Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w17033
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574706
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	James Andreoni,Laura K. Gee. Gun For Hire: Does Delegated Enforcement Crowd out Peer Punishment in Giving to Public Goods?. 2011.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w17033.pdf（184KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览