| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17059 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17059 |
| Theft and Deterrence | |
| William T. Harbaugh; Naci H. Mocan; Michael S. Visser | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-05-20 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, with high school and college students who can anonymously steal real money from each other. Our design allows exogenous variation in the rewards of crime, and the penalty and probability of detection. We find that the probability of stealing is increasing in the amount of money that can be stolen, and that it is decreasing in the probability of getting caught and in the penalty for getting caught. Furthermore, the impact of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger, and the impact of the penalty is bigger when the probability of getting caught is larger. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17059 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574734 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | William T. Harbaugh,Naci H. Mocan,Michael S. Visser. Theft and Deterrence. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17059.pdf（324KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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