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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w17061 |
来源ID | Working Paper 17061 |
Are the Seeds of Bad Governance Sown in Good Times? | |
Antoinette Schoar; Ebonya L. Washington | |
发表日期 | 2011-05-20 |
出版年 | 2011 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper examines the extent to which the corporate governance structure of a firm arises endogenously in response to its performance. We demonstrate that following periods of abnormally good performance, managers are more likely to call special meetings and to propose and pass governance measures that are contrary to shareholder interests (based on IRRC classification). These results are driven primarily by firms that are characterized as having poor governance according to either the GIM Index or the proportion of activist shareholders. Following these special meetings, we find that the next quarter performance of the firm is negative. Our results are consistent with an interpretation of shareholder inattention to governance following good firm performance or a desire to reward management for good past performance. Overall, our evidence seems more consistent with the former interpretation. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17061 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574736 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Antoinette Schoar,Ebonya L. Washington. Are the Seeds of Bad Governance Sown in Good Times?. 2011. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w17061.pdf(172KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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