| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17127 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17127 |
| Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments | |
| Lucian A. Bebchuk; Alma Cohen; Charles C.Y. Wang | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-06-16 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | While staggered boards have been documented to be negatively correlated with firm valuation, such association might be due to staggered boards either bringing about lower firm value or merely reflecting the tendency of low-value firms to have staggered boards. In this paper, we use two natural experiments to shed light on the causality question. In particular, we focus on two recent court rulings, separated by several weeks, that affected in opposite directions the antitakeover force of staggered boards: (i) a ruling by the Delaware Chancery Court approving the legality of shareholder-adopted bylaws that weaken the antitakeover force of a staggered board by moving the company's annual meeting up from later parts of the calendar year to January, and (ii) the subsequent decision by the Delaware Supreme Court to overturn the Chancery Court ruling and invalidate such bylaws. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17127 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574801 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian A. Bebchuk,Alma Cohen,Charles C.Y. Wang. Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17127.pdf（557KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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