| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17172 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17172 |
| Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets | |
| Christos Genakos; Kai-Uwe Kühn; John Van Reenen | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-06-29 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When will a monopolist have incentives to foreclose a complementary market by degrading compatibility/interoperability of his products with those of rivals? We develop a framework where leveraging extracts more rents from the monopoly market by "restoring" second degree price discrimination. In a random coefficient model with complements we derive a policy test for when incentives to reduce rival quality will hold. Our application is to Microsoft's strategic incentives to leverage market power from personal computer to server operating systems. We estimate a structural random coefficients demand system which allows for complements (PCs and servers). Our estimates suggest that there were incentives to reduce interoperability which were particularly strong at the turn of the 21st Century. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Firm Behavior ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17172 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574847 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christos Genakos,Kai-Uwe Kühn,John Van Reenen. Leveraging Monopoly Power by Degrading Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from Computer Markets. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17172.pdf（1555KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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