全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Pay for Percentile

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w17194
来源ID	Working Paper 17194
	Pay for Percentile
	Gadi Barlevy; Derek Neal
发表日期	2011-07-08
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	We analyze an incentive pay scheme for educators that links educator compensation to the ranks of their students within appropriately defined comparison sets, and we show that under certain conditions this scheme induces teachers to allocate socially optimal levels of effort to all students. Moreover, because this scheme employs only ordinal information, it allows education authorities to employ completely new assessments at each testing date without ever having to equate various assessment forms. This approach removes incentives for teachers to teach to a particular assessment form and eliminates opportunities to influence reward pay by corrupting the equating process or the scales used to report assessment results. Education authorities can use the incentive scheme we describe while employing a separate no-stakes assessment system to track secular trends in scaled measures of student achievement.
主题	Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w17194
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574869
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Gadi Barlevy,Derek Neal. Pay for Percentile. 2011.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w17194.pdf（582KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览