| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17234 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17234 |
| \"Last-place Aversion\": Evidence and Redistributive Implications | |
| Ilyana Kuziemko; Ryan W. Buell; Taly Reich; Michael I. Norton | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-07-21 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Why do low-income individuals often oppose redistribution? We hypothesize that an aversion to being in "last place" undercuts support for redistribution, with low-income individuals punishing those slightly below themselves to keep someone "beneath" them. In laboratory experiments, we find support for "last-place aversion" in the contexts of risk aversion and redistributive preferences. Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. Similarly, in money- transfer games, those randomly placed in second-to-last place are the least likely to costlessly give money to the player one rank below. Last-place aversion predicts that those earning just above the minimum wage will be most likely to oppose minimum-wage increases as they would no longer have a lower-wage group beneath them, a prediction we confirm using survey data. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Poverty and Wellbeing ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17234 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574909 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ilyana Kuziemko,Ryan W. Buell,Taly Reich,et al. \"Last-place Aversion\": Evidence and Redistributive Implications. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17234.pdf（1449KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
