| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17251 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17251 |
| Inefficiencies from Metropolitan Political and Fiscal Decentralization: Failures of Tiebout Competition | |
| Stephen Calabrese; Dennis N. Epple; Richard Romano | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-07-28 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the welfare effects of provision of local public goods in an empirically relevant setting using a multi-community model with mobile and heterogeneous households, and with flexible housing supplies. We characterize the first-best allocation and show efficiency can be implemented with decentralization using head taxes. We calibrate the model and compare welfare in property-tax equilibria, both decentralized and centralized, to the efficient allocation. Inefficiencies with decentralization and property taxation are large, dissipating most if not all the potential welfare gains that efficient decentralization could achieve. In property tax equilibrium centralization is frequently more efficient! An externality in community choice underlies the failure to achieve efficiency with decentralization and property taxes: Poorer households crowd richer communities and free ride by consuming relatively little housing thereby avoiding taxes. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Regional and Urban Economics ; Regional Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17251 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574926 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stephen Calabrese,Dennis N. Epple,Richard Romano. Inefficiencies from Metropolitan Political and Fiscal Decentralization: Failures of Tiebout Competition. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17251.pdf（373KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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