| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17262 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17262 |
| Trade Policy Making in a Model of Legislative Bargaining | |
| Levent Celik; Bilgehan Karabay; John McLaren | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-07-28 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff. The results pose a challenge to empirical work, since equilibrium trade policy is a function not only of economic fundamentals but also of political variables at the time of congressional negotiations - some of them random realizations of mixed bargaining strategies. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; International Economics ; Trade |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17262 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574937 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Levent Celik,Bilgehan Karabay,John McLaren. Trade Policy Making in a Model of Legislative Bargaining. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17262.pdf（554KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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