| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17284 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17284 |
| Equilibrium Wage and Employment Dynamics in a Model of Wage Posting without Commitment | |
| Melvyn G. Coles; Dale T. Mortensen | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-08-11 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A rich but tractable variant of the Burdett-Mortensen model of wage setting behavior is formulated and a dynamic market equilibrium solution to the model is defined and characterized. In the model, firms cannot commit to wage contracts. Instead, the Markov perfect equilibrium to the wage setting game, characterized by Coles (2001), is assumed. In addition, firm recruiting decisions, firm entry and exit, and transitory firm productivity shocks are incorporated into the model. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Unemployment and Immigration |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17284 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574959 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Melvyn G. Coles,Dale T. Mortensen. Equilibrium Wage and Employment Dynamics in a Model of Wage Posting without Commitment. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17284.pdf（301KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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