| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17293 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17293 |
| Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances? | |
| Daron Acemoglu; James A. Robinson; Ragnar Torvik | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-08-11 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence politicians through non-electoral means. In weakly-institutionalized polities where such non-electoral influences, particularly by the better organized elite, are a major concern, voters may prefer a political system without checks and balances as a way of insulating politicians from these influences. When they do so, they are effectively accepting a certain amount of politician (presidential) rents in return for redistribution. We show that checks and balances are less likely to emerge when the elite is better organized and is more likely to be able to influence or bribe politicians, and when inequality and potential taxes are high (which makes redistribution more valuable to the majority). We also provide case study evidence from Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela and econometric evidence on voter attitudes from a Latin American survey consistent with the model. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17293 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574968 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daron Acemoglu,James A. Robinson,Ragnar Torvik. Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17293.pdf（550KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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