| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17295 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17295 |
| Information Percolation in Segmented Markets | |
| Darrell Duffie; Semyon Malamud; Gustavo Manso | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-08-11 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We calculate equilibria of dynamic double-auction markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors are segmented into groups that differ with respect to characteristics determining information quality, including initial information precision as well as market "connectivity," the expected frequency of their trading opportunities. Investors with superior information sources attain strictly higher expected profits, provided their counterparties are unable to observe the quality of those sources. If, however, the quality of bidders' information sources are commonly observable, then, under conditions, investors with superior information sources have strictly lower expected profits. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; General Equilibrium ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17295 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574970 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Darrell Duffie,Semyon Malamud,Gustavo Manso. Information Percolation in Segmented Markets. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17295.pdf（542KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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