| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17316 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17316 |
| Vertical Integration and Optimal Reimbursement Policy | |
| Christopher Afendulis; Daniel Kessler | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-08-18 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Health care providers may vertically integrate not only to facilitate coordination of care, but also for strategic reasons that may not be in patients' best interests. Optimal Medicare reimbursement policy depends upon the extent to which each of these explanations is correct. To investigate, we compare the consequences of the 1997 adoption of prospective payment for skilled nursing facilities (SNF PPS) in geographic areas with high versus low levels of hospital/SNF integration. We find that SNF PPS decreased spending more in high integration areas, with no measurable consequences for patient health outcomes. Our findings suggest that subjecting integrated providers to higher-powered reimbursement incentives, i.e., less cost-sharing, may enhance medical productivity. More generally, we conclude that it may be efficient for purchasers of health services (and other services subject to agency problems) to consider the organizational form of their suppliers when choosing a reimbursement mechanism. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17316 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574991 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher Afendulis,Daniel Kessler. Vertical Integration and Optimal Reimbursement Policy. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17316.pdf（115KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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