| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17340 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17340 |
| Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets | |
| Soohyung Lee; Muriel Niederle; Hye-Rim Kim; Woo-Keum Kim | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-08-19 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The large literature on costly signaling and the somewhat scant literature on preference signaling had varying success in showing the effectiveness of signals. We use a field experiment to show that even when everyone can send a signal, signals are free and the only costs are opportunity costs, sending a signal increases the chances of success. In an online dating experiment, participants can attach "virtual roses" to a proposal to signal special interest in another participant. We find that attaching a rose to an offer substantially increases the chance of acceptance. This effect is driven by an increase in the acceptance rate when the offer is made to a participant who is less desirable than the proposer. Furthermore, participants endowed with more roses have more of their offers accepted than their counterparts. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17340 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575014 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Soohyung Lee,Muriel Niederle,Hye-Rim Kim,et al. Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17340.pdf（179KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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