| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17367 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17367 |
| Trading and Enforcing Patent Rights | |
| Alberto Galasso; Mark Schankerman; Carlos J. Serrano | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-08-25 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how the market for innovation affects enforcement of patent rights. Conventional wisdom associates the gains from trade with comparative advantage in manufacturing or marketing. We show that these gains imply that patent transactions should increase litigation risk. We identify a new source of gains from trade, comparative advantage in patent enforcement, and show that transactions driven by this motive should reduce litigation. Using data on trade and litigation of individually-owned patents in the U.S., we exploit variation in capital gains tax rates as an instrument to identify the causal effect of trade on litigation. We find that taxes strongly affect patent transactions, and that reallocation of patent rights reduces litigation risk on average, but the impact is heterogeneous. We show that patents with larger potential gains from trade are more likely to change ownership, suggesting that the market for innovation is efficient, and the impact of trade on litigation depends on characteristics of the transactions. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17367 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575041 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Galasso,Mark Schankerman,Carlos J. Serrano. Trading and Enforcing Patent Rights. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17367.pdf（610KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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