| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17368 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17368 |
| Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation | |
| John R. Graham; Si Li; Jiaping Qiu | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-08-25 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the role of firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation. We decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time invariant firm and especially manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay. We then show that in many settings, it is important to include fixed effects to mitigate potential omitted variable bias. Furthermore, we find that compensation fixed effects are significantly correlated with management styles (i.e., manager fixed effects in corporate policies). Finally, the method used in the paper has a number of potential applications in financial economics. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17368 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575042 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John R. Graham,Si Li,Jiaping Qiu. Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17368.pdf（319KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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