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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w17370 |
来源ID | Working Paper 17370 |
Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within Firms | |
John R. Graham; Campbell R. Harvey; Manju Puri | |
发表日期 | 2011-08-25 |
出版年 | 2011 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We survey more than 1,000 CEOs and CFOs to understand how capital is allocated, and decision-making authority is delegated, within firms. We find that CEOs are least likely to share or delegate decision-making authority in mergers and acquisitions, relative to delegation of capital structure, payout, investment, and capital allocation decisions. We also find that CEOs are more likely to delegate decision authority when the firm is large or complex. Delegation is less likely when the CEO is particularly knowledgeable about a project, when the CEO has an MBA degree or long tenure, and when the CEO's pay is tilted towards incentive compensation. We study capital allocation in detail and learn that most companies allocate funds across divisions using the net present value rule, the reputation of the divisional manager, the timing of a project‟s cash flows, and senior management's "gut feel." Corporate politics and corporate socialism are more important allocation criteria in foreign countries than in the U.S. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17370 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575044 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John R. Graham,Campbell R. Harvey,Manju Puri. Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within Firms. 2011. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w17370.pdf(697KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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