| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17436 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17436 |
| Competition in Persuasion | |
| Matthew Gentzkow; Emir Kamenica | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-09-15 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e., the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize the equilibrium set and governs whether introducing additional senders or decreasing the alignment of senders’ preferences necessarily increases the amount of information revealed. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17436 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575110 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Gentzkow,Emir Kamenica. Competition in Persuasion. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17436.pdf（495KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
