| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17448 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17448 |
| Costly Contracts and Consumer Credit | |
| Igor Livshits; James MacGee; Michèle Tertilt | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-09-22 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Financial innovations are a common explanation of the rise in consumer credit and bankruptcies. To evaluate this story, we develop a simple model that incorporates two key frictions: asymmetric information about borrowers' risk of default and a fixed cost to create each contract offered by lenders. Innovations which reduce the fixed cost or ameliorate asymmetric information have large extensive margin effects via the entry of new lending contracts targeted at riskier borrowers. This results in more defaults and borrowing, as well as increased dispersion of interest rates. Using the Survey of Consumer Finance and interest rate data collected by the Board of Governors, we find evidence supporting these predictions, as the dispersion of credit card interest rates nearly tripled, and the share of credit card debt of lower income households nearly doubled. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17448 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575122 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Igor Livshits,James MacGee,Michèle Tertilt. Costly Contracts and Consumer Credit. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17448.pdf（436KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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