| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17449 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17449 |
| Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi | |
| Xavier Giné; Jessica Goldberg; Dean Yang | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-09-22 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We report the results of a randomized field experiment that examines the credit market impacts of improvements in a lender's ability to determine borrowers' identities. Improved personal identification enhances the credibility of a lender's dynamic repayment incentives by allowing it to withhold future loans from past defaulters and expand credit for good borrowers. The experimental context, rural Malawi, is characterized by an imperfect identification system. Consistent with a simple model of borrower heterogeneity and information asymmetries, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. The change in repayment rates is driven by reductions in adverse selection (smaller loan sizes) and lower moral hazard (for example, less diversion of loan-financed fertilizer from its intended use on the cash crop). |
| 主题 | Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17449 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575123 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Xavier Giné,Jessica Goldberg,Dean Yang. Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17449.pdf（530KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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