| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17472 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17472 |
| Is There a 'Hidden Cost of Control' in Naturally-Occurring Markets? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment | |
| Craig E. Landry; Andreas Lange; John A. List; Michael K. Price; Nicholas G. Rupp | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-09-29 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Several recent laboratory experiments have shown that the use of explicit incentives--such as conditional rewards and punishment--entail considerable "hidden" costs. The costs are hidden in the sense that they escape our attention if our reasoning is based on the assumption that people are exclusively self-interested. This study represents a first attempt to explore whether, and to what extent, such considerations affect equilibrium outcomes in the field. Using data gathered from nearly 3000 households, we find little support for the negative consequences of control in naturally-occurring labor markets. In fact, even though we find evidence that workers are reciprocal, we find that worker effort is maximized when we use conditional--not unconditional--rewards to incent workers. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17472 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575145 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Craig E. Landry,Andreas Lange,John A. List,et al. Is There a 'Hidden Cost of Control' in Naturally-Occurring Markets? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17472.pdf（190KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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