| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17518 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17518 |
| Ending \"Too Big To Fail\": Government Promises vs. Investor Perceptions | |
| Todd A. Gormley; Simon Johnson; Changyong Rhee | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-10-20 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Can a government credibly promise not to bailout firms whose failure would have major negative systemic consequences? Our analysis of Korea's 1997-99 crisis, suggests an answer: No. Despite a general "no bailout" policy during the crisis, the largest Korean corporate groups (chaebol) - facing severe financial and governance problems - could still borrow heavily from households through issuing bonds at prices implying very low expected default risk. The evidence suggests "too big to fail" beliefs were not eliminated by government promises, presumably because investors believed that this policy was not time consistent. Subsequent government handling of potential and actual defaults by Daewoo and Hyundai confirmed the market view that creditors would be protected. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17518 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575193 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Todd A. Gormley,Simon Johnson,Changyong Rhee. Ending \"Too Big To Fail\": Government Promises vs. Investor Perceptions. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17518.pdf（267KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
