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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w17535
来源IDWorking Paper 17535
Organizational Economics and Physician Practices
James B. Rebitzer; Mark E. Votruba
发表日期2011-10-20
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要Economists seeking to improve the efficiency of health care delivery frequently emphasize two issues: the fragmented structure of physician practices and poorly designed physician incentives. This paper analyzes these issues from the perspective of organizational economics. We begin with a brief overview of the structure of physician practices and observe that the long anticipated triumph of integrated care delivery has largely gone unrealized. We then analyze the special problems that fragmentation poses for the design of physician incentives. Organizational economics suggests some promising incentive strategies for this setting, but implementing these strategies is complicated by norms of autonomy in the medical profession and by other factors that inhibit effective integration between hospitals and physicians. Compounding these problems are patterns of medical specialization that complicate coordination among physicians. We conclude by considering the policy implications of our analysis - paying particular attention to proposed Accountable Care Organizations.
主题Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w17535
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575209
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GB/T 7714
James B. Rebitzer,Mark E. Votruba. Organizational Economics and Physician Practices. 2011.
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