| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17535 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17535 |
| Organizational Economics and Physician Practices | |
| James B. Rebitzer; Mark E. Votruba | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-10-20 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Economists seeking to improve the efficiency of health care delivery frequently emphasize two issues: the fragmented structure of physician practices and poorly designed physician incentives. This paper analyzes these issues from the perspective of organizational economics. We begin with a brief overview of the structure of physician practices and observe that the long anticipated triumph of integrated care delivery has largely gone unrealized. We then analyze the special problems that fragmentation poses for the design of physician incentives. Organizational economics suggests some promising incentive strategies for this setting, but implementing these strategies is complicated by norms of autonomy in the medical profession and by other factors that inhibit effective integration between hospitals and physicians. Compounding these problems are patterns of medical specialization that complicate coordination among physicians. We conclude by considering the policy implications of our analysis - paying particular attention to proposed Accountable Care Organizations. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17535 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575209 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James B. Rebitzer,Mark E. Votruba. Organizational Economics and Physician Practices. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17535.pdf（178KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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