| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17538 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17538 |
| Adverse Selection and Incentives in an Early Retirement Program | |
| Kenneth T. Whelan; Ronald G. Ehrenberg; Kevin F. Hallock; Ronald L. Seeber | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-10-27 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We evaluate potential determinants of enrollment in an early retirement incentive program for non-tenure-track employees of a large university. Using administrative record on the eligible population of employees not covered by collective bargaining agreements, historical employee count and layoff data by budget units, and public information on unit budgets, we find dips in per-employee finance in a budget unit during the application year and higher recent per employee layoffs were associated with increased probabiliites of eligible employee program enrollment. Our results also suggest, on average, that employees whose salaries are lower than we would predict given their personal characteristics and job titles were more likely to enroll in the early retirement program. To the extent that employees' compensation reflects their productivity, as it should under a pay system in which annual salary increases are based on merit, this finidng suggests that adverse selection was not a problem with the program. That is, we find no evidence that on average the "most productive" employees took the incentive. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17538 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575212 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kenneth T. Whelan,Ronald G. Ehrenberg,Kevin F. Hallock,et al. Adverse Selection and Incentives in an Early Retirement Program. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17538.pdf（236KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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