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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w17542
来源IDWorking Paper 17542
Sovereign Debt, Government Myopia, and the Financial Sector
Viral V. Acharya; Raghuram G. Rajan
发表日期2011-10-27
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? We develop a model where myopic governments seek popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when debt is low because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending; they do not default as debt builds up, and net new borrowing becomes difficult, because of the adverse consequences from default to the domestic financial sector. More myopic governments default less often, but tax in a more distortionary way and increase the vulnerability of the domestic financial sector to future government debt default.
主题Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w17542
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575216
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GB/T 7714
Viral V. Acharya,Raghuram G. Rajan. Sovereign Debt, Government Myopia, and the Financial Sector. 2011.
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