| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17542 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17542 |
| Sovereign Debt, Government Myopia, and the Financial Sector | |
| Viral V. Acharya; Raghuram G. Rajan | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-10-27 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? We develop a model where myopic governments seek popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when debt is low because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending; they do not default as debt builds up, and net new borrowing becomes difficult, because of the adverse consequences from default to the domestic financial sector. More myopic governments default less often, but tax in a more distortionary way and increase the vulnerability of the domestic financial sector to future government debt default. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17542 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575216 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Viral V. Acharya,Raghuram G. Rajan. Sovereign Debt, Government Myopia, and the Financial Sector. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17542.pdf（1082KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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