| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17545 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17545 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? | |
| Ernst Fehr; Oliver D. Hart; Christian Zehnder | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-10-27 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)'s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. We investigate the relevance of these features experimentally. Our evidence indicates that the central behavioral mechanism underlying the concept of contractual reference points is robust to the presence of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. However, our data also reveal new behavioral features that suggest refinements of the theory. In particular, we find that the availability of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation changes how trading parties evaluate ex post outcomes. Interestingly, the availability of these additional options affects ex post evaluations even in situations in which the parties do not use them. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17545 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575219 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ernst Fehr,Oliver D. Hart,Christian Zehnder. How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17545.pdf（215KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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