| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17562 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17562 |
| Fiscal Policy and Unemployment | |
| Marco Battaglini; Stephen Coate | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-11-03 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper explores the interaction between fiscal policy and unemployment. It develops a dynamic economic model in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts and public spending increases. Such policies are fiscally costly, but can be financed by issuing government debt. In the context of this model, the paper analyzes the simultaneous determination of fiscal policy and unemployment in long run equilibrium. Outcomes with both a benevolent government and political decision-making are studied. With political decision-making, the model yields a simple positive theory of fiscal policy and unemployment. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17562 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575236 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Battaglini,Stephen Coate. Fiscal Policy and Unemployment. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17562.pdf（663KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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