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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w17579 |
来源ID | Working Paper 17579 |
Laws and Norms | |
Roland Benabou; Jean Tirole | |
发表日期 | 2011-11-04 |
出版年 | 2011 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences ("values"), material or other explicit incentives ("laws") and social sanctions or rewards ("norms"). It first examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individuals' behaviors and inferences, and how they interact with material incentives. It then characterizes optimal incentive-setting in the presence of norms, deriving in particular appropriately modified versions of Pigou and Ramsey taxation. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Culture |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17579 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575253 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roland Benabou,Jean Tirole. Laws and Norms. 2011. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w17579.pdf(449KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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