| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17587 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17587 |
| The Welfare Economics of Default Options in 401(k) Plans | |
| B. Douglas Bernheim; Andrey Fradkin; Igor Popov | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-11-10 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Default contribution rates for 401(k) pension plans powerfully influence workers’ choices. Potential causes include opt-out costs, procrastination, inattention, and psychological anchoring. We examine the welfare implications of defaults under each of these theories. We show how the optimal default, the magnitude of the welfare effects, and the degree of normative ambiguity depend on the behavioral model, the scope of the choice domain deemed welfare-relevant, the use of penalties for passive choice, and other 401(k) plan features. Depending on which theory and welfare perspective one adopts, virtually any default contribution rate may be optimal. Still, our analysis provides reasonably robust justifications for setting the default either at the highest contribution rate matched by the employer or – contrary to common wisdom – at zero. We also identify the types of empirical evidence needed to determine which case is applicable. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17587 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575262 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | B. Douglas Bernheim,Andrey Fradkin,Igor Popov. The Welfare Economics of Default Options in 401(k) Plans. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17587.pdf（685KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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