全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Size Inequality, Coordination Externalities and International Trade Agreements

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w17603
来源ID	Working Paper 17603
	Size Inequality, Coordination Externalities and International Trade Agreements
	Nuno Limao; Kamal Saggi
发表日期	2011-11-17
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	Developing countries now account for a significant fraction of both world trade and two thirds of the membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, many are still individually small and thus have a limited ability to bilaterally extract and enforce trade concessions from larger developed economies even though as a group they would be able to do so. We show that this coordination externality generates asymmetric outcomes under agreements that rely on bilateral threats of trade retaliation. such as the WTO. but not under agreements extended to include certain financial instruments. In particular, we find that an extended agreement generates improvements in global efficiency and equity if it Includes the exchange of bonds prior to trading but not if it relies solely on ex-post fines. Moreover, a combination of bonds and fines generates similar improvements even if small countries are subject to financial constraints that prevent them from posting bonds.
主题	International Economics ; Trade ; International Macroeconomics ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w17603
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575278
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Nuno Limao,Kamal Saggi. Size Inequality, Coordination Externalities and International Trade Agreements. 2011.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w17603.pdf（226KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览