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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w17603 |
来源ID | Working Paper 17603 |
Size Inequality, Coordination Externalities and International Trade Agreements | |
Nuno Limao; Kamal Saggi | |
发表日期 | 2011-11-17 |
出版年 | 2011 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Developing countries now account for a significant fraction of both world trade and two thirds of the membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, many are still individually small and thus have a limited ability to bilaterally extract and enforce trade concessions from larger developed economies even though as a group they would be able to do so. We show that this coordination externality generates asymmetric outcomes under agreements that rely on bilateral threats of trade retaliation. such as the WTO. but not under agreements extended to include certain financial instruments. In particular, we find that an extended agreement generates improvements in global efficiency and equity if it Includes the exchange of bonds prior to trading but not if it relies solely on ex-post fines. Moreover, a combination of bonds and fines generates similar improvements even if small countries are subject to financial constraints that prevent them from posting bonds. |
主题 | International Economics ; Trade ; International Macroeconomics ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17603 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575278 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nuno Limao,Kamal Saggi. Size Inequality, Coordination Externalities and International Trade Agreements. 2011. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w17603.pdf(226KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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