| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17624 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17624 |
| When Should Sellers Use Auctions? | |
| James W. Roberts; Andrew Sweeting | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-11-23 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously or sequentially. In the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous entrants' decisions. The relative performance of these mechanisms is investigated when entry is costly and selective, meaning that potential buyers with higher values are more likely to participate. A simple sequential mechanism can give both buyers and sellers significantly higher payoffs than the commonly used simultaneous bid auction. The findings are illustrated with parameters estimated from simultaneous entry USFS timber auctions where our estimates predict that the sequential mechanism would increase revenue and efficiency. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17624 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575299 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James W. Roberts,Andrew Sweeting. When Should Sellers Use Auctions?. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17624.pdf（297KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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