全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk: Evidence from Procurement

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w17647
来源ID	Working Paper 17647
	Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk: Evidence from Procurement
	Gregory Lewis; Patrick Bajari
发表日期	2011-12-08
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	Deadlines and penalties are widely used to incentivize effort. We model how these incentive contracts affect the work rate and time taken in a procurement setting, characterizing the efficient contract design. Using new micro-level data on Minnesota highway construction contracts that includes day-by-day information on work plans, hours actually worked and delays, we find evidence of moral hazard. As an application, we build an econometric model that endogenizes the work rate, and simulate how different incentive structures affect outcomes and the variance of contractor payments. Accounting for the traffic delays caused by construction, switching to a more efficient design would substantially increase welfare without substantially increasing the risk borne by contractors.
主题	Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w17647
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575321
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Gregory Lewis,Patrick Bajari. Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk: Evidence from Procurement. 2011.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w17647.pdf（322KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览